February cases

In the last two weeks of the month, the Court will hear arguments regarding union agency or “fair share” fees, political t-shirts worn to the voting booth, subpoenas to US companies for information stored on foreign servers, and other important issues.

Tuesday, February 20
(the Court observes Presidents Day on Monday)

Currier v. Virginia is a fairly technical issue regarding double jeopardy.  The doctrine of “issue preclusion” aka “collateral estoppel” prevents re-trial of a fact that was necessarily determined by a jury in a prior case.  So even if the defendant is not charged with the same crime, it might still constitute double jeopardy if the second criminal offense relies on a factual question that a jury resolved in favor of the defendant in an earlier trial.  In this case, the defendant was accused of stealing guns.  He had a prior felony conviction, so it would have been illegal for him to even possess the guns.  With his agreement, the state first tired him for larceny and breaking and entering, and severed the charge of “felon in possession of a firearm.”  The jury found in favor of the defendant in the first trial, but the state proceeded to try him for possession anyway, and this time convinced the jury.  The issue is whether issue preclusion, and thus the double jeopardy clause, applies even where the defendant agreed to sever the charges.  The arguments on both sides are described in scotusblog’s preview.

The second case today, City of Hays, Kansas v. Vogt, involves the right against self-incrimination, interestingly in the context of alleged police misconduct.  Under threat of being fired, a police officer told his supervisors how he came into possession of a knife while on duty.  He was then charged with a range of crimes, and although the charges were dropped before trial, the officer’s statements regarding the knife were used against him during a probable cause hearing. When he had trouble finding another job, he sued the City for violating his constitutional rights.  The Fifth Amendment prohibits being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against [oneself].”  It’s fairly settled that threat of termination is compelled, but is use during a preliminary proceeding covered by the amendment? The City is being represented by the UVA Law School’s Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, which has an useful story about the case. The Court accepted cert. on the question “Whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when statements are used at a probable cause hearing but not at a criminal trial.”  A collection of government employers filed an amicus brief urging the Court to hold that the city cannot be held liable for the decision of the prosecutors; it will be interesting the see if the Court views this as within the scope of the question they agreed to review.

Wednesday, February 21

Both cases today will be a bit technical for the casual observer, but nevertheless should be interesting.

First, Rosales-Mireles v. U.S. involves waiver and plain error, in the context of illegal immigration. The defendant pleaded guilty to “illegal reentry” (returning to the US after being deported).  He had a prior criminal history, which increases the sentence.  However, the trial court counted a prior conviction for misdemeanor assault twice.  The government concedes that this was in error and placed him in the wrong sentencing guidelines category (77-96 months instead of the correct 70-87 months; he got 78 months). However, there was no objection at the time of sentencing, which means that an appellate court may only correct it if it constitutes “plain error.”  In the Fifth Circuit, this means not only obviously wrong but is the kind of error “that would shock the conscience of the common man, serve as a powerful indictment against our system of justice, or seriously call into question the competence or integrity of the district judge.”  The Circuit held that this error was not of that nature, and declined or order re-sentencing. The Supreme Court has accepted cert. to resolve whether that final condition for plain error review is appropriate.

For the second case, Dahda v. U.S., the official question presented is probably sufficient:  “Whether Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520, requires suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a wiretap order that is facially insufficient because the order exceeds the judge’s territorial jurisdiction.”

Monday, February 26

An extremely important case involving union “agency fees” or “fair share fees” is up first today, Janus v. AFSCME. In order to prevent discrimination based on union membership, the National Labor Relations Act requires that all employees be covered by a union contract — so workers are not getting different wages or working conditions depending solely on whether or not they joined the union.  But negotiating, administering, and enforcing a contract costs money.  Therefore, the Supreme Court held in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) that even employees who decline to join the union can be required to pay the union for these expenses.  Unions are required to calculate their spending precisely, and bill non-members an appropriate fraction of the membership fee; only money collected from voluntary members may be spent on non-workplace activities (like electoral campaigns).  This principle has been under attack in recent years, and many people predicted that Justice Scalia would have been the fifth vote to reverse these precedents if he hadn’t died after cert. was granted in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n but before a decision was issued.  The resulting 4-4 split left in place the Circuit court’s decision, which had ruled for the union based on those longstanding precedents.  This case brings the issue back to the Court. Scotusblog has a useful overview as well as an online symposium with a range of views.  This is a very important case and will draw a lot of attention — and early and long lines to get inside, but also press conferences and protests out front.

Ohio v. American Express is an antitrust case, arising out of differences in how AmEx, compared with Visa and MasterCard, set prices and work with merchants.  The Second Circuit sided with AmEx, but an unusually wide range of organizations are lining up on the other side.

Tuesday, February 27

The clash of new technology and old legal presumptions is on display in US v. Microsoft.  The federal government served a subpoena on Microsoft at their Washington state headquarters for emails of a suspected drug dealer. It agreed to turn over records stored in the US, but not the content of the emails, which were stored in servers in Ireland.  There is a general presumption that US laws do not apply outside the US (extraterritorial application), and the Court has never resolved how this relates to the Stored Communications Act or technology of this nature in general.  There are lots of interesting and nuanced concerns about effectiveness of our laws but the need to avoid putting international actors in a conflict with other countries’ laws.  Scotusblog has an overview and an online symposium with some really compelling insights.

An absurd example of First Amendment retaliation hits an 11th Circuit doctrine in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida.  During the public comment portion of a City Council meeting, Mr. Lozman was instructed by a council member not to discuss his opposition to an eminent domain plan, and he was arrested when he persisted.  The transcript of an earlier meeting revealed a plan by council members to “intimidate” him.  He sued, but lost the trial and sought a new trial on various grounds.  The 11th Circuit held that the police officer had probable cause to arrest him for disrupting a public meeting, and therefore there could be no lawsuit for unconstitutional retaliation or any other grounds, because of the Circuit’s rule that a finding of probable cause bars any other such claims.  See this overview and the ACLU position.

Wednesday, February 28

First Amendment protection for political expression at the voting booth is the issue in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky:  “Whether Minnesota statute Section 211B.11, which broadly bans all political apparel at the polling place, is facially overbroad under the First Amendment.”  Again, Scotusblog has a useful overview and interesting symposium.

February cases

This month, the Court will consider a wrongful death claim involving a cross-border shooting by a Border Patrol agent, arbitration agreements in the context of alleged wrongful death of nursing home residents, and sex offender laws in immigration and free speech contexts.

Tuesday, Feb 21

A tragic case made more politically interesting in the context of current US-Mexico tensions is up first today, in Hernández v. Mesa. A 15 year-old boy was shot and killed by a US Border Patrol agent.  The agent fired from US territory, but the boy was in Mexico.  That much is undisputed; the parents say he was playing a game that involved touching the fence and running back, while the agent says this was part of an illegal border crossing that involved a group throwing rocks at agents. But the Court will decide only whether this dispute can get as far as trial:  does the 4th Amendment apply to use of force under these circumstances, and can the parents bring a suit like this?  A through description of all the legal issues is available here.

McLane Co v. EEOC is a more procedural issue without much suspense.  Federal courts enforce or quash (cancel) subpoenas issued by federal agencies like the EEOC.  All but one Circuit court decides based on whether the EEOC abused its discretion (which is deferential toward the agency), but the 9th does so based on de novo review (its own original determination, with no deference to the agency). Interesting arguments on both sides are described here.

Wednesday, Feb 22

The Court hears only one case today, involving arbitration agreements, which have been the subject of much controversy recently.  Historically, the Court has held that the Federal Arbitration Act serves as a very serious obstacle to any state laws that would restrict the enforceability of arbitration agreements.  Kindred Nursing Centers v. Clark involves deceased residents of a nursing home whose “principals” (individuals who held their power of attorney) sued the home for for wrongful death, personal injury, and violations of certain Kentucky laws protecting nursing home residents.  The home sought to dismiss the cases based on the mandatory arbitration agreement those principles had signed on behalf of the residents, but the Kentucky Supreme Court held that they lacked authority to enter the arbitration agreement because the right to a jury trial and to appeal to higher courts are fundamental constitutional rights that cannot be waived absent express authority to do so. A thorough discussion of the case is available here.

Monday, February 27

The Court takes on sex offender laws in two cases today, in immigration and free speech contexts.

The question in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions is: Whether a conviction under one of the seven state statutes criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21-year-old and someone almost 18 constitutes an “aggravated felony” of “sexual abuse of a minor” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act – and therefore constitutes grounds for mandatory removal.

In Packingham v. North Carolina, the issue is: Whether, under the court’s First Amendment precedents, a law that makes it a felony for any person on the state’s registry of former sex offenders to “access” a wide array of websites – including Facebook, YouTube, and nytimes.com – that enable communication, expression, and the exchange of information among their users, if the site is “know[n]” to allow minors to have accounts, is permissible, both on its face and as applied to petitioner, who was convicted based on a Facebook post in which he celebrated dismissal of a traffic ticket, declaring “God is Good!”

January Cases

This week, the Court considers a free speech challenge to credit card surcharges, litigation sanctions, and what standards for a free appropriate public education for students with disabilities.  Next week, the Court takes on both disparaging trademarks and the rights of detainees who claim they were held in severe conditions of confinement based only on racial profiling.

Tuesday, January 10

An interesting case this morning involves claims of free speech rights in an unusual context:  credit card fees.  Merchants pay a fee to credit card companies, but ten states prohibit them from passing on that fee as a “surcharge.”  The group of merchants in Expressions Hair Design v Schneiderman argue that this prohibition is an unconstitutional limitation on speech.  The Second Circuit rejected that, holding that it only regulates commercial practices (conduct, not speech), but the merchants note that the law allows them to offer a discount for paying with cash, so as a practical matter, it regulates what they call it rather than what they charge.

The second case, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, involves the scope of a court’s inherent power to award attorney fees and other sanctions where a party engages in some form of litigation misconduct.

Wednesday, January 11

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires states to provide children with disabilities with a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE), but that is not fully defined.  Some courts, including the lower courts in this case (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District), have held that it requires only that the state provide some sort of education that is of more than minimal value to the student.  Other courts, and the Obama Administration in this case, have argued that this is not enough, and the standard should involve a “meaningful” education.

[This is the only case being argued today, and is scheduled for one hour.  However, the Solicitor General is arguing along with the parties, so it may run a few minutes long.]

Wednesday, January 18

Two significant and contentious issues are before the Court today.

First, the Court considers the provision in the Trademark Act that allows for refusal to register the trademark if it would “disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). The specific case (Lee v. Tam) involves Samuel Tam, who named his band The Slants in order to bring attention to discrimination against Asians, “following in the long tradition of reappropriation, in which members of minority groups have reclaimed terms that were once directed at them as insults and redirected the terms outward as badges of pride.”  This case will have implications for the current name of the Washington football team, among other contentious current issues.

Next, the court considers detainee rights in Ziglar v. Abbasi and Hasty v. Abbasi, which allege that, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, individuals were arrested and detained in extreme conditions on the basis of no evidence other than race, religion, and national origin.  The Atlantic offers an overview and makes predictions of the sort of reception the cases are likely to receive.  The Center for Constitutional Rights has detailed information about their case.  [The parties had requested additional time for argument, but that was denied and the cases are considered with one hour total.  I would expect it to run a little long nonetheless.]

 

Inaugural Parade Protests (DC Cir)

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals will hear arguments on Monday (Nov. 14) in a case involving the rights of protesters to line the Inaugural Parade Route on January 20, 2017.  The Partnership for Civil Justice went to court back in 2000 and successfully secured access for protesters on Inauguration Day 2001, but according to this release:

In an unprecedented court filing, the U.S. Government and its Justice Department argue that the government may take the public parklands, sidewalks and streets of America at the central moment of their use by the people for assembly, speech and debate, and petitioning of the government and redesignate our public spaces into exclusive “government speech” or No Free Speech Zones. There is no limitation to the scope of these zones.

Circuit arguments are open to the public and typically do not draw much of a crowd, although it would be wise to get there a bit early for Monday’s.

Monday, November 14 – 9:30 a.m.
US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit
333 Constitution Avenue
Courtroom 31